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By using graphical representations of budget sets over bundles of
state-contingent commodities, we generate a very rich data set well-
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1suited to studying behavior under uncertainty at the level of the indi-
vidual subject. We test the data for consistency with the maximization
hypothesis, and we estimate preferences using a two-parameter utility
function based on Faruk Gul (1991). This speciﬁcation provides a good
interpretation to the data at the level of the individual subject and can
account for the highly heterogeneous behaviors observed in the labo-
ratory. The parameter estimates jointly describe attitudes toward risk
and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences in the
population.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D81, C91.
Key Words: uncertainty, revealed preference, Expected Utility The-
ory, loss/disappointment aversion, experiment.
We report the results of a series of experiments using an innovative graph-
ical interface that we apply to studying decision making under uncertainty.
In our experimental design, subjects see a graphical representation of a
standard budget constraint on a computer screen. This can be interpreted
either as a portfolio choice problem (the allocation of wealth between two
risky assets) or a consumer decision problem (the selection of a bundle of
contingent commodities subject to a standard budget constraint). Subjects
use the mouse to choose a portfolio by pointing-and-clicking on the budget
line. This intuitive and user-friendly interface allows for the quick and eﬃ-
cient elicitation of many decisions per subject from a wide variety of budget
constraints. The result is a rich individual-level data set that is at the core
of this paper’s contribution.
The beneﬁts of our approach are immediately evident from inspecting
the scatter diagrams of data from individual subjects, which reveal many
distinct patterns in subjects’ behaviors. Sometimes they choose safe port-
folios that guarantee the same return in each state of nature. Sometimes
they bet everything on one state, as if they were risk neutral. Sometimes
they respond smoothly to changes in the risk-return tradeoﬀ. The behav-
ior of subjects is generally complex and impossible to classify in a simple
taxonomy. Nonetheless, in almost every case, one or more of these distinct
patterns can be clearly distinguished. We call this patterning “granularity,”
for want of a better term. (In computer science, granularity is a measure of
the size or number of components in a system, with a course-grained sys-
tem having relatively few, large components. Here, granularity refers to the
number of distinct aspects or features displayed by individual behavior.)
Although individual behavior is granular (made up of distinct behavior
patterns), the second striking fact is the high level of consistency in the
individual level decisions. That is, most subjects behave as if they were
2maximizing a complete, transitive preference ordering over lotteries (port-
folios). A well-known theorem of Sidney N. Afriat (1967) states that an
individual’s choices from a ﬁnite number of budget sets are consistent with
maximization of a well behaved utility function if and only if they satisfy
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). The broad range of
budget sets that our experiment involves provides a rigorous test of GARP.
In particular, the changes in endowments and relative prices are such that
budget lines cross frequently. This means that our data lead to high power
tests of revealed preference conditions. Our subjects attain very high scores
on standard measures of consistency and most are close to the ideal of per-
fectly rational behavior.
The consistency of individual decisions naturally leads us to ask what
kind of preferences are consistent with the observed choices. Our third dis-
covery is that the data is well explained by a preference ordering in which
the indiﬀerence curves have a kink at the 45 degree line. One interpreta-
tion of this preference ordering is that it displays loss or disappointment
aversion (Eddie Dekel, 1986; Gul, 1991). Expected Utility Theory (EUT)
is a special case of this theory. The family of utility functions we estimate
is characterized by two parameters, one of which measures loss or disap-
pointment aversion. Over half of our subjects have a signiﬁcant degree of
loss or disappointment aversion. The remainder appear to be well approxi-
mated by preferences consistent with EUT (John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern, 1947; Leonard J. Savage, 1954).
Because preferences are characterized by two parameters, we cannot eas-
ily summarize attitudes toward risk by a single number. However, we can
compute a risk premium based on the diﬀerence between the expected value
of a gamble and its certainty equivalent. Comparing the risk premium to a
standard measure of risk aversion suggests that our estimates are within the
range found by other researchers (cf. Kay-Yen Chen and Charles R. Plott,
1998; Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury, 2002; Jacob K. Goeree, Holt,
and Thomas R. Palfrey, 2003, 2004; Goeree and Holt, 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a dis-
cussion of closely related literature. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and procedures. Section 3 illustrates some important features of
the data and establishes the consistency of the data with utility maximiza-
tion. Section 4 provides the econometric analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
Experimental instructions, technical details, and individual-level data are
gathered in appendices.
31 Related literature
The experimental literature on choice under uncertainty is vast and cannot
be summarized here. Colin F. Camerer (1995) provides a comprehensive dis-
cussion of the experimental and theoretical work, and Chris Starmer (2000)
provides a more recent review that focuses on evaluating non-EUT theo-
ries. The typical experimental design presents subjects with a number of
binary choices. The objective is to test the empirical validity of particular
axioms or to compare the predictive abilities of competing theories. These
theories tend to be systematically disconﬁrmed by the data. This has moti-
vated researchers to develop more descriptive models, and the investigation
of these models has led to the discovery of new empirical regularities in the
laboratory.
Typically, the criterion used to evaluate a theory is the fraction of choices
it predicts correctly. A theory is “rejected” when the pattern of violations
appears to be systematic. More recently, following the seminal work of
John D. Hey and Chris Orme (1994) and David W. Harless and Camerer
(1994), a number of papers compare models while allowing for randomness.
In these studies, randomness can be interpreted as the eﬀect of a trembling
hand, calculation error, and so forth. While Harless and Camerer (1994)
ﬁt models to aggregate data, Hey and Orme (1994) use data derived from
decisions over a very large menu of binary choices and estimate functional
forms for individual subjects. They test EUT as a restriction on non-EUT
theories and ﬁnd that EUT appears to ﬁt as well as non-EUT alternatives
for almost 40 percent of their subjects and that violations of EUT decay
with repetition.
A few other studies, such as Imran S. Currim and Rakesh K. Sarin
(1989), Richard L. Daniels and L. Robin Keller (1990), and Pamela K. Lat-
timore, Joanna R. Baker and A. Dryden Witte (1992) have also estimated
parametric utility functions for individual subjects. These studies ﬁnd that
many subjects obey EUT, with considerable variation in risk aversion across
subjects. Our paper — both in its experimental method and theoretical appa-
ratus — substantially extends this research program by providing new tech-
niques and larger samples that enable more precise estimation and better
predictions. Camerer (1995) emphasizes the need for such improvements in
advancing the research program in this area.
The distinctive features of the present paper are the new experimen-
tal design and the application of tools from consumer demand theory to
individual decision making in the laboratory. This experimental design gen-
erates data that are better suited in a number of ways to estimating risk
4preferences. First, the choice of a portfolio from a convex budget set pro-
vides more information about preferences than a discrete choice.1 Second,
the large amount of individual-level data generated by this design allows
us to apply statistical models to individual data rather than pooling data
or assuming homogeneity across subjects. Hence, we may generate better
individual-level estimates of risk aversion. Third, these decision problems
are representative, both in the statistical sense and in the economic sense,
rather than, as in existing methods, being designed to test a particular the-
ory.
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas M. Gale, and Shachar Kariv
(forthcoming) illustrate the application of the experimental platform that
has been developed in this paper facilitates the analysis of decisions under
uncertainty at the individual level. Their analysis builds on revealed pref-
erence techniques to determine whether the choices of hypothetical subjects
are consistent with utility maximization and to recover their underlying
preferences. The experimental technique can also be applied to many types
of individual choice problems. For example, Fisman, Kariv, and Daniel
Markovits (2006) employ a similar experimental methodology to study so-
cial preferences. While the papers share a similar experimental methodology,
they address very diﬀerent questions and produce very diﬀerent behaviors.
2 Experimental design and procedures
2.1 Design
In the experimental task we study, individuals make decisions under con-
ditions of uncertainty about the objective parameters of the environment.
In our preferred interpretation, there are two states of nature denoted by
s =1 ,2 and two associated Arrow securities, each of which promises a payoﬀ
of one unit of account in one state and nothing in the other. We consider
the problem of allocating an individual’s wealth between the two Arrow se-
curities. Let xs denote the demand for the security that pays oﬀ in state s
and let ps denote its price. We normalize the individual’s wealth to 1.T h e
budget constraint is then p1x1+p2x2 =1and the individual can choose any
portfolio (x1,x 2) ≥ 0 that satisﬁes this constraint.
1In Loomes (1991) subjects also allocate wealth in a portfolio of risky assets. The
focus of this paper is on providing a test of the independence axiom, so the results are not
directly comparable to those presented here. Loomes (1991) showed that most subjects
made nearly rational choices but systematically violated the intendance axiom, and that
the observed behavior cannot be accommodated by a number of non-EUT alternatives.
5An example of a budget constraint deﬁn e di nt h i sw a yi st h es t r a i g h t
line AB drawn in Figure 1. The axes measure the future value of a possible
p o r t f o l i oi ne a c ho ft h et w os t a t e s . T h ep o i n tC, which lies on the 45
degree line, corresponds to a portfolio with a certain payoﬀ. By contrast,
point A (point B) represents a portfolio in which all wealth is invested in
the security that pays oﬀ in state 1 (state 2). A portfolio such as C is
called a safe portfolio and portfolios such as A and B are called boundary
portfolios. A portfolio that is neither a safe nor a boundary portfolio is called
an intermediate portfolio. Notice that, given the objective probabilities of
each state, positions on AB do not represent fair bets (portfolios with the
same expected value as the a safe portfolio). If π is the probability of state 1
and the slope of the budget line −p1/p2 is steeper than −π/(1−π),p o s i t i o n s
along AC have a higher payoﬀ in state 1,al o w e rp a y o ﬀ in state 2,a n da
lower expected portfolio return than point C.
[Figure 1 here]
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Experimental Social Science Labo-
ratory (X-Lab) at UC Berkeley under the X-Lab Master Human Subjects
Protocol. The 93 subjects in the experiment were recruited from undergrad-
uate classes and staﬀ at UC Berkeley. After subjects read the instructions
(reproduced in Appendix I), the instructions were read aloud by an ex-
perimenter. Each experimental session lasted about one and a half hours.
Payoﬀs were calculated in terms of tokens and then converted into dollars.
Each token was worth $0.5. A $5 participation fee and subsequent earnings,
which averaged about $19, were paid in private at the end of the session.
Each session consisted of 50 independent decision rounds. In each round,
a subject was asked to allocate tokens between two accounts, labeled x and
y.T h ex account corresponds to the x-axis and the y account corresponds
to the y-axis in a two-dimensional graph. Each choice involved choosing a
point on a budget line of possible token allocations. Each round started by
having the computer select a budget line randomly from the set of lines that
intersect at least one axis at or above the 50 token level and intersect both
axes at or below the 100 token level. The budget lines selected for each
subject in his decision problems were independent of each other and of the
budget lines selected for other subjects in their decision problems.
The x-axis and y-axis were scaled from 0 to 100 tokens. The resolution
compatibility of the budget lines was 0.2 tokens. At the beginning of each
6decision round, the experimental program dialog window went blank and
the entire setup reappeared. The appearance and behavior of the pointer
were set to the Windows mouse default and the pointer was automatically
repositioned randomly on the budget line at the beginning of each round.
To choose an allocation, subjects used the mouse or the arrows on the key-
board to move the pointer on the computer screen to the desired allocation.
Subjects could either left-click or press the Enter key to record their alloca-
tions. No subject reported diﬃculty understanding the procedures or using
the computer interface. (The computer program dialog window is shown in
the experimental instructions which are reproduced in Appendix I.)
At the end of the round, the computer randomly selected one of the
accounts, x or y. Each subject received the number of tokens allocated to
the account that was chosen. We studied a symmetric treatment (subjects
ID 201-219 and 301-328), in which the two accounts were equally likely
(π =1 /2)a n dt w oasymmetric treatments (subjects ID 401-417, 501-520 and
601-609) in which one of the accounts was selected with probability 1/3 and
the other account was selected with probability 2/3 (π =1 /3 or π =2 /3).
The treatment was held constant throughout a given experimental session.
Subjects were not informed of the account that was actually selected at the
end of each round. At the end of the experiment, the computer selected
one decision round for each participant, where each round had an equal
probability of being chosen, and the subject was paid the amount he had
earned in that round.
3 From data to preferences
3.1 Data description
We begin with an overview of some important features of the experimental
data. We will focus on the symmetric treatment, where the regularities in
the data are very clear, and select a small number of subjects who illustrate
salient features of the data. One must remember, however, that for most
subjects the data are much less regular. Figure 2 depicts, for each subject,
the relationship between the log-price ratio ln(p1/p2) a n dt h et o k e ns h a r e
x1/(x1+x2).T h eﬁgures for the full set of subjects are available in Appendix
II, which also shows the portfolio choices (x1,x 2) as points in a scatterplot,
and the relationship between the log-price ratio ln(p1/p2) and the bud-
get share p1x1 (prices are normalized by income so that p1x1 + p2x2 =1 ).
Clearly, the distinction between token share and budget share is only rele-
vant in the presence of price changes.
7[Figure 2 here]
Figure 2A depicts the choices of a subject (ID 304) who always chose
nearly safe portfolios x1 = x2.T h i sb e h a v i o ri sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hi n ﬁnite risk
aversion. Figure 2B shows the choices of the only subject (ID 303) who,
with a few exceptions, made nearly equal expenditures p1x1 = p2x2.T h i s
behavior is consistent with a logarithmic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. This is a very special case, where the regularity in the data is
very clear. We also ﬁnd many cases of subjects who implemented “smooth”
responsiveness of portfolio allocations to prices, albeit less precisely. Among
these subjects, we ﬁnd considerable heterogeneity in price sensitivity. Per-
haps most interestingly, no subject in the symmetric treatment allocated
all the tokens to x1 if p1 <p 2 and to x2 if p1 >p 2. This is the behavior
that would be implied by pure risk neutrality, for example. Nevertheless,
boundary portfolios (x1,0) and (0,x 2) were used in combination with other
portfolios by many subjects, as we will see below.2
Another interesting regularity is illustrated in Figure 2C, which depicts
the decisions of a subject (ID 307) who allocated all of his tokens to x1 (x2)
for values of ln(p1/p2) that give a ﬂat (steep) budget line. This aspect of
his behavior would be consistent with risk neutrality. However, for a variety
of intermediate prices corresponding to ln(p1/p2) around zero, this subject
chose nearly safe portfolios x1 = x2. This aspect of his choice behavior is
consistent with inﬁnite risk aversion. So this subject is apparently switching
between behaviors that are individually consistent with EUT, but mutually
inconsistent. In fact, as we will see in the econometric analysis below, this
subject’s preferences exhibit loss or disappointment aversion (where the safe
portfolio x1 = x2 is taken to be the reference point).
There are yet more ﬁne-grained cases where the behavior is less stark,
such as the subject (ID 216) whose choices are depicted in Figure 2D. This
subject combines intermediate portfolios for a variety of intermediate rela-
tive prices with boundary portfolios for prices that give suﬃciently ﬂat or
steep budget lines. Further, the subject (ID 318) whose choices are depicted
in Figure 2E combines safe, intermediate and boundary portfolios. There
is something distinctly discontinuous in the behavior of these subjects and
their choices are clearly not consistent with the standard interpretation of
2A single subject (ID 508) almost always chose x1 =0if p1 >p 2 and x2 =0otherwise.
However, he participated in the asymmetric treatment (π =2 /3) and thus his choices do
not correspond to risk neutrality. Three subjects (ID 205, 218 and 320) chose a minimum
level of consumption of ten tokens in each state, and allocated the residual to the less
expensive security.
8EUT.
These are of course special cases, where the regularities in the data are
very clear. There are many subjects for whom the behavioral rule is much
less clear and there is no taxonomy that allows us to classify all subjects
unambiguously. But even in cases that are harder to classify, we can pick out
the safe, intermediate, and boundary portfolios described above. Overall,
a review of the full data set reveals striking regularities within and marked
heterogeneity across subjects.
3.2 Testing rationality
Before proceeding to a parametric analysis of the data, we want to check
whether the observed data are consistent with any preference ordering, EU
or non-EU. To answer this question, we need to make use of some results
from the theory of revealed preference. A well-known result, due to Afriat
(1967), tells us that a ﬁnite data set generated by an individual’s choices can
be rationalized by a well-behaved (piecewise linear, continuous, increasing
and concave) utility function, if and only if the data satisﬁes the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).3 GARP requires that if a portfolio
x is revealed preferred to x0 then x0 i sn o ts t r i c t l yr e v e a l e dp r e f e r r e dt ox.
So, in order to show that the data are consistent with utility-maximizing
behavior, we can simply check whether it satisﬁes GARP (simple in theory,
though diﬃcult in practice for moderately large data sets).
Since GARP oﬀers an exact test (either the data satisfy GARP or they
do not) and choice data almost always contain at least some violations, we
also wish to measure the extent of GARP violations. We report measures
of GARP violations based on an index proposed by Afriat (1972). Afriat’s
critical cost eﬃciency index (CCEI) measures the amount by which each
budget constraint must be adjusted in order to remove all violations of
GARP. Figure 3 illustrates one such adjustment for a simple violation of
GARP involving two portfolios, x1 and x2.4 It is clear that x1 is revealed
preferred to x2 because x2 is cheaper than x1 at the prices at which x1 is
purchased, and x2 is revealed preferred to x1,s i n c ex1 is cheaper than x2
at the prices at which x2 is purchased. If we shifted the budget constraint
through x2 as shown, the violation would be removed. In this case, the
CCEI would equal A/B (A/B > C/D).
3This statement of the result follows Hal R. Varian (1982), who replaced the condition
Afriat called cyclical consistency with GARP.
4In fact, here we have a violation of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP).
Note that if choices violate WARP they need not violate GARP.
9[Figure 3 here]
By deﬁnition, the CCEI is a number between 0 and 1, where a value
of 1 indicates that the data satisfy GARP perfectly. There is no natural
threshold for determining whether subjects are close enough to satisfying
GARP that they can be considered utility maximizers. Varian (1991) sug-
gests a threshold of 0.95 for the CCEI, but this is purely subjective. A more
scientiﬁc approach, proposed by Stephen G. Bronars (1987), calibrates the
various indices using a hypothetical subject whose choices are uniformly
distributed on the budget line. We generated a random sample of 25,000
subjects and found that their scores on the Afriat CCEI indices averaged
0.60.5 Furthermore, all 25,000 random subjects violated GARP at least
once, and none had a CCEI score above Varian’s 0.95 threshold. If we
choose the 0.9 eﬃciency level as our critical value, we ﬁnd that only 12 of
the random subjects had CCEI scores above this threshold.
Figure 4 compares the distributions of the CCEI scores generated by the
sample of 25,000 hypothetical subjects (gray) and the distributions of the
scores for the actual subjects (black).6 The horizontal axis shows the value
of the index and the vertical axis measures the percentage of subjects cor-
responding to each interval. The histograms clearly show that a signiﬁcant
majority of the subjects did much better than the randomly generated sub-
jects and only a bit worse than an ideal (rational) subject. Our experiment
is thus suﬃciently powerful to exclude the possibility that consistency is the
accidental result of random behavior. As a practical note, the consistency
results presented above suggest that subjects did not have any diﬃculties in
understanding the procedures or using the computer program.
[Figure 4 here]
The power of the experiment is very sensitive to the number of obser-
vations for each subject. To illustrate this point, we simulated the choices
of random subjects in two experiments which used the design of this paper
except that in one, subjects made 10 choices and in the other, they made 25
choices. In each case, the simulation was based on 25,000 random subjects.
5Each of the 25,000 random subjects makes 50 choices from randomly generated budget
sets, in the same way that the human subjects do.
6To allow for small trembles resulting from the slight imprecision of subjects’ handling
of the mouse, all the results presented below allow for a narrow conﬁdence interval of one
token (for any i and j 6= i,i f
 x
i,x
j  ≤ 1 then x
i and x
j are treated as the same portfolio).
We generate virtually identical results allowing for a narrower conﬁdence interval.
10In the simulated experiment with 25 choices, 4.3 percent of random sub-
jects were perfectly consistent, 14.3 percent had CCEI scores above Varian’s
0.95 threshold, and 28.9 percent had values above 0.90.I n t h e s i m u l a t e d
experiment with only 10 choices, the corresponding percentages were 20.2,
37.3,a n d50.6. In other words, there is a very high probability that random
behavior will pass the GARP test if the number of individual decisions is
as low as it usually has been in earlier experiments. We refer the interested
reader to Choi, Fisman, Gale and Kariv (forthcoming) for further details on
the power of tests for consistency with GARP.
Appendix III lists, by subject, the number of violations of WARP and
GARP, and also reports the values of the three indices according to descend-
ing CCEI scores. Although it provides a summary statistic of the overall
consistency of the data with GARP, the CCEI does not give any information
about which of the observations are causing the most severe violations. We
refer the interested reader to Appendix III for precise details on testing for
consistency with GARP and other indices that have been proposed for this
purpose by Varian (1991) and Martijn Houtman and J. A. H. Maks (1985).
The various indices are all computationally intensive for even moderately
large data sets. (The computer program and details of the algorithms are
available from the authors upon request.)
4E c o n o m e t r i c a n a l y s i s
4.1 Speciﬁcation
The near consistency of subjects’ choices tells us that there exists a well-
behaved utility function that rationalizes most of the data. Additionally,
because of the nature of the data, particularly the clustering at the safe
and boundary portfolios, EUT cannot provide a plausible ﬁtf o rt h ed a t a
at the individual level. The particular patterns observed in the data lead
us to consider the theory of loss/disappointment aversion proposed by Gul
(1991), which implies that the utility function over portfolios (x1,x 2) takes
the form
min{αu(x1)+u(x2),u(x1)+αu(x2)},
where α ≥ 1 is a parameter measuring loss/disappointment aversion (where
the safe portfolio x1 = x2 i st a k e nt ob et h er e f e r e n c ep o i n t )a n du(·) is the
utility of consumption in each state. If α>1 there is a kink and if α =1we
have the standard EUT representation. This formulation thus embeds EUT
as a parsimonious and tractable special case and allows for the estimation
11of the parameter values in our empirical analysis below.
To implement this approach, we assume that u(·) takes the power form





where ρ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. The parameters
in this two-parameter speciﬁcation, α and ρ, jointly describe the attitudes
toward risk and allow us to characterize the distribution of risk preferences
in the population.
The use of the power function has one limitation, however, in that the
function is not well deﬁned for the boundary portfolios. We incorporate
the boundary observations (1/p1,0) or (0,1/p2) into our estimation using
strictly positive portfolios where the zero component is replaced by a small
consumption level such that the demand ratio x1/x2 is either 1/ω or ω,
respectively. The minimum ratio is chosen to be ω =1 0 −3. The selected
level did not substantially aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients for any subject.
With this adjustment, maximizing the utility function subject to the
budget constraint yields a non-linear relationship between ln(p1/p2) and
ln(x1/x2), which is illustrated in Figure 5 below. If the security prices
are very diﬀerent, then the optimum is the boundary portfolio with the
larger expected payoﬀ. If the security prices are very similar (log-price
ratios are close to zero), then the optimum is the safe portfolio. In these
cases, the optimal choice is insensitive to small price changes. For log-
price ratios that are neither extreme nor close to zero, the optimum is an
intermediate portfolio and the choice is sensitive to small changes in the
risk-return tradeoﬀ.
[Figure 5 here]
The subject’s demand will belong to one of ﬁve possible cases: (i)a
corner solution in which x1 = ω¯ x2 if x1/x2 <ω ;( ii)a ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n
where ω ≤ x1/x2 < 1;( iii) a corner solution where x2 = ω¯ x1 if 1/ω < x1/x2;
(iv) an interior solution where 1 <x 1/x2 ≤ 1/ω;a n d( v) a solution at the
kink where x1/x2 =1 .7 The two interior solutions are characterized by ﬁrst-
order conditions in the form of equations; the two corner solutions and the
kink are characterized by inequalities. Combining these cases, we can deﬁne
7Intuitively, these conditions set the ratio of demands x1/x2 equal to ω or 1/ω when
observations are near to the boundary.
12an individual-level econometric speciﬁcation for each subject n separately,
and generate estimates of ˆ αn and ˆ ρn using nonlinear least squares (NLLS).

























1 for each observation i). Next, we identify the ﬁve
diﬀerent cases discussed above (corner solutions, interior solutions, kink).
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Before proceeding to estimate the parameters, we omit the nine subjects
with CCEI scores below 0.80 (ID 201, 211, 310, 321, 325, 328, 406, 504 and
603) as their choices are not suﬃciently consistent to be considered utility-
generated. We also exclude the three subjects (ID 205, 218 and 320) who
almost always chose a minimum level of consumption of ten tokens in each
state, and the single subject (ID 508) who almost always chose a boundary
portfolio. This leaves a total of 80 subjects (86.0 percent) for whom we
recover preferences by estimating the model. Finally, we note that out of
the 80 subjects, 33 subjects (41.3 percent) have no boundary observations
and this increases to a total of 60 subjects (75.0 percent) if we consider
subjects with less than ﬁve boundary observations.
Appendix IV presents the results of the estimations ˆ αn and ˆ ρn for the
full set of subjects. Table 1 below displays summary statistics for the esti-
mation results. Of the 80 subjects listed in Appendix IV, 56 subjects (70.0
percent) exhibit kinky preferences (ˆ αn > 1). Also, a signiﬁcant fraction of
our subjects in both treatments have moderate levels of ˆ ρn. However, our
speciﬁcation allows the kink (α) to “absorb” some of the curvature in the
13indiﬀerence curves (ρ). More importantly, because the model has two para-
meters, α and ρ, it is not obvious how to deﬁne (a single measure of) risk
aversion. In the next section, we deﬁne one particularly useful measure and
discuss its properties.
[Table 1 here]
Figure 6 presents, in graphical form, the data from Appendix IV by
showing a scatterplot of ˆ αn and ˆ ρn split by symmetric (black) and asym-
metric (white) treatments. Nine subjects with high values for ˆ ρn (ID 206,
210, 304, 306, 404, 407, 515, 516, and 606) and one subject (ID 203) with a
high value of ˆ αn are omitted to facilitate presentation of the data. The most
notable features of the distributions in Figure 6 are that both the symmetric
and asymmetric subsamples exhibit considerable heterogeneity in both ˆ αn
and ˆ ρn and that their values are not correlated (r2 =0 .000).
[Figure 6 here]
Finally, Figure 7 shows the relationship between ln(p1/p2) and ln(ˆ x1/ˆ x2)
for the same group of subjects (ID 304, 303, 307, 216, and 318) that we fol-
lowed in the non-parametric analysis. Figure 7 also depicts the actual choices
(x1,x 2).T h e ﬁgures for the full set of subjects are available in Appendix
V. An inspection of the estimation results against the observed data reveals
that the ﬁt is quite good for most subjects. However, it also shows that the
speciﬁcation has diﬃculty dealing with the subject (ID 307) who combines
safe portfolios for values of ln(p1/p2) close to zero with boundary portfolios
for values of ln(p1/p2) that give steep or ﬂat budget lines. His estimated
parameters ˆ α =1 .043 and ˆ ρ =0 .076 may be reasonable given the fact that
boundary portfolios are chosen also for intermediate values of ln(p1/p2), but
leaves the safe portfolio choices largely unexplained. For similar reasons,
the estimated curve does not pick up the apparent kink in the scatterplot
of the subject (ID 318) with ˆ α =1 .056 and ˆ ρ =0 .173 that often chose safe
portfolios. Clearly, no continuous relationship could replicate these patterns.
The estimation also seems sensitive to “outliers,” as can be seen in the
case of the subject (ID 303) with ˆ α =1 .641 and ˆ ρ =0 .284, who is the only
subject that very precisely implemented logarithmic preferences, apart from
a small number of deviations. Although his behavior is very regular and
ﬁts with standard preferences, the attempt to ﬁt the outlying observations
exaggerates the non-linearity and leads to the insertion of a spurious kink.
Apart from this subject, the individual-level relationship between ln(p1/p2)
14and ln(ˆ x1/ˆ x2) does not have a kink unless one is clearly identiﬁable in the
data. In fact, a review of our full set of subjects shows that the estimation
is more likely to ignore a kink that is evident in the data than to invent one
that is not there. Perhaps most notably, the estimation ﬁts the “switch”
points, when they exist, quite well.
[Figure 7 here]
Finally, we note that while we have followed prior literature in using a
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) speciﬁcation, we are concerned that
our estimates may be sensitive to this assumption. In particular, one diﬃ-
culty with assuming CRRA is that behavior depends on the initial level of
wealth ω0, and since ω0 is unobserved, the model is not completely iden-
tiﬁed. In the analysis above, we have followed the standard procedure of
setting ω0 =0 . We have also estimated the model with the assumption
of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The CARA utility function has
two advantages. First, it allows us to get rid of the nuisance parameter ω0
(which bedevils most attempts estimate power utility functions). Secondly,
it easily accommodates boundary portfolios.
The problem with CARA is that it implies a (non-linear) relationship
between log(p1/p2) and x1 − x2. Since the variation in log(p1/p2) is quite
small relative to the variation in x1 − x2, the estimated individual-level
regression coeﬃcients are bound to be small. This implies that the estimated
coeﬃcients of absolute risk aversion and loss/disappointment aversion will be
small too, but this seems unlikely given the behavior of the subjects, which
suggests a non-negligible degree of risk aversion. We refer the interested
reader to Appendix VI for precise details on the CARA speciﬁcation and
results of the estimations.
4.2 Measuring risk aversion
Since we have estimated a two-parameter utility function, risk aversion can-
not be represented by a single univariate measure. To summarize the risk
aversion of our subjects, we use the concept of the risk premium.S p e c i ﬁ-
cally, we propose a gamble over wealth levels which oﬀers 50 − 50 odds of
winning or losing some fraction 0 <h<1 of the individual’s initial wealth
ω0. The risk premium for h is the fraction of wealth r that satisﬁes the
certainty equivalence relationship
(1 + α)u(ω0(1 − r)) = αu(ω0(1 − h)) + u(ω0(1 + h)).
15Substituting the power function yields
(1 + α)(1 − r)1−ρ = α(1 − h)1−ρ +( 1+h)1−ρ,









To help us understand the meaning of the parameters α and ρ,F i g u r e8
below plots the risk premium r(h) for diﬀerent values of α and ρ.N o t et h a t
an increase in α makes the risk premium curve r(h) steeper and an increase
in ρ makes it more convex.
[Figure 8 here]
To see the role of α and ρ more clearly, we consider the second-order ap-
proximation of r(h). Direct calculation yields








(α +1 ) 2h2,
which reduces to the usual case r(h) ≈ ρh2
2 when α =1 . The approximation
clearly tells us that α has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on the risk premium r while
ρ has a second-order eﬀect, so the standard practice of considering small
gambles is inadequate. Motivated by the second-order approximation of











which reduces to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion ρ when
α =1 .W ew i l lu s er(1) as a summary measure of risk aversion.
Although there is no strong theoretical rationale for adopting this for-
mula as our summary measure of risk aversion, it agrees with other measures
of risk aversion. As a benchmark, we use the “low-tech” approach of esti-
mating an individual-level power utility function directly from the data.
16By straightforward calculation, the solution to the maximization problem
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and the budget constraint p·x∗ =1 . This generates the following individual-


















n is assumed to be distributed normally with mean zero and variance
σ2
n.W eg e n e r a t ee s t i m a t e so fˆ αn and ˆ βn using ordinary least squares (OLS),
and use this to infer the values of the underlying parameter ˆ ρn =1 /ˆ βn.
Before proceeding to the estimations, we again omit the nine subjects
with CCEI scores below 0.80 as well the four subjects (ID 307, 311, 324 and
508) for whom the simple power formulation is not well deﬁned. This leaves
the group of 77 subjects (82.8 percent) for whom we estimated parameters.
For these subjects, we discard the boundary observations, for which the
power function is not well deﬁned, using a narrow conﬁdence interval of one
token (if xi
1 ≤ 1 or xi
2 ≤ 1 then xi is treated as a boundary portfolio). This
results in many fewer observations for a small number of subjects.
Appendix VII lists the estimated risk measures ˆ rn and values of ˆ ρn de-
rived from the simple OLS estimation for the full set of subjects except for
the two subjects (ID 508 and 603) who always choose boundary portfolios.
The last column of Appendix VII reports the number of observations per
subject in the OLS estimation. Table 2 below displays summary statistics.
Most notably, the distribution shifts to the left when calculated using the
ˆ rn estimates as compared to the distribution calculated using the OLS ˆ ρn
estimates. The reason may be the upward bias in the OLS estimates due to
the omission of boundary observations.
[Table 2 here]
Figure 9 shows a scatterplot of ˆ rn and ˆ ρn, split by symmetric (black)
and asymmetric (white) treatments. Subjects with high values for ˆ rn or ˆ ρn
(ID 203, 204, 206, 210, 304, 306, 314, 404, 407, 408, 413, 515, 516, 606 and
607) are omitted to facilitate presentation of the data. Note that we ob-
tain once more very similar distributions for the symmetric and asymmetric
subsamples, and that there is a strong correlation between the estimated
ˆ rn parameters and individual-level estimates of ˆ ρn that come from a simple
expected-utility model (r2 =0 .488).
17[Figure 9 here]
Much of the existing evidence about risk preferences is based on labo-
ratory experiments. Our individual-level measures of risk aversion are very
similar to some recent estimates that come out of the simple expected-utility
model. For comparison, Chan and Plott (1998) and Goeree, Holt and Pal-
frey (2002) report, respectively, ρ =0 .48 and 0.52 for private-value auctions.
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2003) estimate ρ =0 .44 for asymmetric matching
pennies games, and Goeree and Holt (2004) report ρ =0 .45 for a variety of
one-shot games. Holt and Laury (2002) estimate individual degrees of risk
aversion from ten paired lottery-choices under both low- and high-money
payoﬀs. Most of their subjects in both treatments exhibit risk preferences
in the 0.3 − 0.5 range.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We present a set of experimental results which build on a graphical com-
puter interface that contains a couple of important innovations over previous
work. The primary contribution is an experimental technique for collecting
richer data on choice under uncertainty than was previously possible. Per-
haps the most interesting aspect of the data set generated by this approach
is the granularity of behavior. Subjects’ behavior appears to be made up
of a small number of stylized patterns of behavior, sometime choosing safe
portfolios, sometimes choosing boundary portfolios, and sometimes choos-
ing intermediate portfolios. In the present paper, we have shown that this
behavior can be rationalized by “kinky” preferences that are consistent with
loss or disappointment aversion. The potential of this data set to teach us
about individual behavior has not been exhausted, however. One aspect of
the data that invites further scrutiny is the rather curious switching between
stylized behavior patterns exhibited by some subjects. We plan to explore
this and other themes in future work based on further extensions of our
experimental design.
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20α All π=1/2 π≠1/2
Mean 1.315 1.390 1.248
Std 0.493 0.584 0.388
p5 1.000 1.000 1.000
p25 1.000 1.000 1.000
p50 1.115 1.179 1.083
p75 1.445 1.477 1.297
p95 2.427 2.876 2.333
ρ All π=1/2 π≠1/2
Mean 1.662 2.448 0.950
Std 7.437 10.736 1.206
p5 0.053 0.048 0.080
p25 0.233 0.165 0.290
p50 0.481 0.438 0.573
p75 0.880 0.794 0.990
p95 3.803 3.871 3.693
Table 1: Summary statistics of individual-level estimationr(1) All π=1/2 π≠1/2
Mean 1.834 1.041 2.608
Std 7.580 1.211 10.594
p5 0.201 0.114 0.201
p25 0.432 0.411 0.465
p50 0.612 0.613 0.609
p75 0.990 1.076 0.983
p95 3.865 3.865 3.953
OLS All π=1/2 π≠1/2
Mean 3.168 1.401 4.888
Std 15.025 1.362 21.060
p5 0.439 0.439 0.375
p25 0.648 0.597 0.700
p50 0.904 0.826 1.011
p75 1.434 1.426 1.533
p95 5.348 5.158 5.448
Table 2. Summary statistics of risk measuresFigure 1: An example of a budget constraint with two states and two assets. 
 









A: ID 304 B: ID 303 C: ID 307
D: ID 216 E: ID 318Figure 3: The construction of the CCEI for a simple violation of GARP. 
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